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DIVINE SIMPLICITY: A NEW DEFENSE 
William F. Vallicella 
The doctrine of divine simplicity, according to which God is devoid of phys-
ical or metaphysical complexity, is widely believed to be incoherent. I argue 
that although two prominent recent attempts to defend it fail, it can be de-
fended against the charge of obvious incoherence. The defense rests on the 
isolation and rejection of a crucial assumption, namely, that no property is 
an individual. I argue that there is nothing in our ordinary concepts of prop-
erty and individual to warrant the assumption, and that once the assumption 
is rejected, the way is clear to viewing the divine attributes as self-exempli-
fying properties whose self-exemplification entails their identity with an in-
dividual. 
Among the entailments of the classical theistic doctrine of divine simplicity 
as found in Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas are such baffling claims as that 
God is identical with each of his essential properties; that these properties 
are identical with each other; and that there is no distinction in God between 
essence and existence. If true, the simplicity doctrine promises the theist 
considerable advantages: a possible way around the Euthyphro Paradox,' an 
explanation of why God is a necessary being,2 and a premise for a short 
non-modal ontological argument. 3 But not only does the doctrine promise 
these advantages, it also seems to be an inescapable logical consequence of 
the central theistic idea that, necessarily, God is the creator and sustainer of 
everything distinct from himself. This has been rigorously and persuasively 
argued by Brian Leftow. 4 The argument in outline is that since God cannot 
create his own nature, and since everything distinct from God is existentially 
dependent on God, God is identical with his nature. 
Unfortunately, however, the simplicity doctrine will strike many philoso-
phers as it does Quentin Smith, who writes that "this doctrine is plainly 
self-contradictory, and its hold on some people's minds testifies to the pre-
dominance of faith over intellectual coherence in some Christian circles."5 
And indeed it does seem self-contradictory to say that God, an individual, is 
identical with his essential properties, since this seems to imply that God is 
a property and hence not an individual.6 And so the simplicity doctrine seems 
to issue in the absurdity that God both is and is not an individual. It also 
seems to entail that God both has and does not have a plurality of properties.7 
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For if God by definition is omniscient, omnipotent, etc., then he has a plu-
rality of properties; but if these properties are identical with one another, then 
he does not have a plurality of properties, but exactly one property. One might 
even argue that if this one property is simplicity, then God cannot possess 
the property of existence. Hence if God is simple, he does not exist, and if 
he exists, he is not simple!8 
Although Leftow has shown that what he calls the Identity Thesis (the core 
of the simplicity doctrine) can be derived from the claim that, necessarily, 
God creates everything distinct from himself, he leaves largely undiscussed 
the question of the logical coherence of the Identity Thesis itself.9 If this 
thesis is inconsistent, no argument in its support can be sound. What is 
needed, then, is a direct assault on the consistency question. 
My aim here is accordingly modest: not to argue for the truth of the doc-
trine, but to argue for its consistency. Even more modestly, perhaps, my aim 
is to show, contra Smith, Plantinga, and a host of others, that it is not obvi-
ously inconsistent or otherwise repugnant to the intellect. But before advanc-
ing to the positive task, we do well to examine a couple of extant approaches 
both of which in my judgment fail. 
1. The Approach of Stump and Kretzmann 
According to Stump and Kretzmann, the names of the divine attributes 
... are all identical in reference but different in sense, referring in various ways 
to the one actual entity which is God himself or designating various mani-
festations of it. [Which is it? Different ways of referring to one thing, or 
reference to different things?] 'Perfect power' and 'perfect knowledge' are 
precise analogues for 'the morning star' and 'the evening star': non-synony-
mous expressions designating quite distinct manifestations of one and the 
same thing ... .'Perfect power is identical with perfect knowledge' does not 
entail that power is identical with knowledge any more than the fact that the 
summit of a mountain's east slope is identical with the summit of its west 
slope entails the identity of the slopes. 10 
This passage is confusing, employing as it does two distinct analogies that 
are dubious in themselves and not obviously compatible with each other. The 
Fregean analogy compares identity of properties with identity of individuals: 
the implication is that just as there is no problem in understanding how the 
morning star can be identical with the evening star once we distinguish the 
sense and reference of the relevant expressions, so also there is no problem 
in understanding how perfect power can be identical with perfect knowledge: 
you just distinguish the senses of these terms from each other and from their 
common referent. The senses are distinct, but the referent, God, is one and 
the same. Presumably, the senses of "perfect power" and "perfect knowledge" 
are the properties perfect power and perfect knowledge, respectively, which, 
we are told, are different manifestations of God. In Fregean jargon, they are 
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different Darstellungsweisen, modes of presentation, of one and the same 
thing. But this implies that the two divine attributes in question are not 
identical, but as distinct as the senses of "morning star" and "evening star." 
The point is that the Fregean gambit requires the distinctness of senses in 
order to account for the informativeness of the identity claim; and so if the 
attributes in question are senses, they must be really distinct. If, on the other 
hand, the attributes are not senses but identical with each other and with God, 
then we need to be told what the distinct senses of "perfect power" and 
"perfect knowledge" are. If no answer is forthcoming, the Fregean analogy 
collapses. 
It wiIl not help to say that omniscience and omnipotence differ as concepts 
("in the mind") but are identical as properties ("outside the mind"), for even 
if this is true, it has not been explained how the properties can be identical 
with one another and with God. The problem is one of metaphysics, not of 
philosophy of language. The problem is to explain how God can be identical 
with his properties, not to explain how informative identity statements like 
"God is omniscience" and "Omniscience is omnipotence" are possible. 
Frege's Sinn/Bedeutung distinction may help us with the latter problem; but 
it seems unavailing when applied to the former. 
Whereas the Fregean analogy suggests that perfect power and perfect 
knowledge are distinct as distinct modes of presentation of one and the same 
thing = God, the slope/summit analogy suggests something quite different, 
namely, that the attributes are identical. This is of course more in line with 
what is needed. What the analogy is intended to suggest is that even if F-ness 
and G-ness are distinct, perfect F-ness and perfect G-ness can be identical, 
just as the slopes are distinct shy of the summit, but identical at the summit. 
But this analogy, although a neat representation of the identity of perfect 
power and perfect knowledge assuming the coherence of this identity, does 
nothing to show the coherence or refute the charge of incoherence. One might 
as well try to prove the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity by producing 
a can of "Three-in-One" oil. II The intellect has exigencies of which the 
picture-loving imagination knows nothing. 
2. Mann s Approach 
It is one thing to say that God is identical with each of his properties; quite 
another to say that he is identical with each of his property-instances. Mann's 
way, derived from Aquinas, is the latter.12 Accordingly, God is identical, not 
with omniscience, but with his (instantiation of) omniscience. And similarly 
with the other attributes. If we take this tack, we avoid the consequence that 
God is a property with al\ its supposedly absurd implications. 
Mann has recently conceded to T. V. Morris l3 that the property instance 
view faces a damaging objection: if God is (identically) an instance of a 
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property P, then God is dependent on P to be what he is, namely, an instance 
of P. The divine aseity is thus compromised. As Mann puts it, 
It looks as though a simplicist is confronted with a dilemma. If he adopts the 
property instance view, then he violates the thesis that God exists a se. If he 
adopts the property view, then he is subject to the withering scorn heaped on 
that view by Alvin Plantinga. 14 
Mann would avoid the dilemma by grasping both horns. "What I propose 
is to identify God's omniscience with omniscience itself."'5 In saying this 
Mann clearly evades Morris' objection, but at the price of abandoning the 
property instance approach in favor of the property approach. This lays him 
open to the Plantinga objection which the original property instance theory 
avoided. 
Recall that Plantinga's objection was that God cannot be a property since 
properties, being abstract, are causally inert, whereas God as traditionally 
conceived is an agent. To handle this admittedly powerful objection, Mann 
isolates and rejects" ... an unspoken assumption, namely, that properties are 
abstract objects, incapable of the personal attributes essential to a traditional 
(;onception of God. "16 What they are instead, according to Mann, are "causal 
powers." The implication is obvious: " .. .if properties are causal powers and 
if God is a property, then he is a causal power."17 
But what exactly is Mann's claim here? Clarity bids us distinguish among 
the following: 
(1) Properties are causal powers. 
(2) Properties have causal powers. 
(3) Properties confer causal powers on the things that exemplify them. 
It would appear that (3) is what Mann has in mind: 
P is a property of an object, x, only if P's presence in x confers some causal 
power(s) on x. P and Q are the same property if and only if (1) P and Q 
confer the same causal powers on their objects and (2) whatever is sufficient 
to bring about an instance of P in an object, x, is sufficient to bring about an 
instance of Q in x, and vice versa. IS 
(3) has some initial plausibility.'9 Suppose it is true. And suppose, even more 
charitably, that (3) and (1) express the same or logically equivalent proposi-
tions. How does this help Mann's project? How does it show that God, if a 
property, is not an abstract object bereft of causal efficacy? For causal powers 
are themselves abstract, hence causally inert. I have the power to run 5 miles 
in 40 minutes. But this power does not itself have the power to run 5 miles 
in 40 minutes. What Mann needs is something along the lines of (2): proper-
ties have causal powers. God's being a property would then entail that God 
has causal powers. (2), however, is independent of (1) and (3). And so even 
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if we grant Mann that all genuine (as opposed to what Mann calls mere "Notre 
Dame") properties confer causal powers on their possessors, it does not follow 
that all genuine properties have causal powers. Of course, if the simplicity 
doctrine is coherent, then there is no difference between God's being and having 
causal power(s), but the coherence of the doctrine is precisely what is at issue. 
Thus the view that properties are or confer causal powers does not rescue 
the simplicity doctrine (in its property form) from Plantinga's objection. So 
far, then, we have good reason to think the simplicity doctrine incoherent, 
and no reason to think it coherent. 
3. Property and Individual: An Untenable Dualism 
The doctrine of divine simplicity confronts us with a pair of questions: (i) 
How can God be identical with the properties he exemplifies? and (ii) How 
can the divine properties be identical with one another? If these two can be 
answered, the problem of how essence and existence can be identical in God 
should also be amenable to solution. But since this problem harbors special 
difficulties, its treatment will be reserved for a separate article. 
A short way with (i) would be to say that God just is a property, in which 
case there would be no difficulty in understanding how he could be identical 
with properties. But this is counterintuitive in the extreme. Properties, al-
though ingredients of the real, are inert ingredients thereof. They neither act 
nor react; they neither do nor suffer. Given that God is an agent, he cannot 
be a property unless (and this is an important qualification) he is a property 
that is identical with an individual. We can therefore agree with Plantinga 
when he says that "No property could have created the world; no property 
could be omniscient, or indeed, know anything at a11,"20 while disagreeing 
with his tacit assumption that no property is an individual. 
Thus there is no easy answer to (i). God is in some sense an individual. If 
so, how can he be identical with his properties? The problem arises on the 
plausible assumption that a categorial chasm divides properties and individ-
uals such that, necessarily, no property is an individual. But this might be an 
untenable dualism. It might be that some properties are identical with indi-
viduals. But to discuss this further we need to define our terms. Suppose we 
agree that 
and 
(I) x is an individual iff (i) x exemplifies properties, (ii) x is not multiply 
exemplifiable, and (iii) x is not exemplifiable by anything distinct from 
itself;21 
(P) P is a property iff P is possibly such that it is exemplified.22 
Is (I) adequate? Call every individual other than God an "ordinary" individ-
ual, whether it be a continuant, set, event-token, or anything else that is not 
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a property or relation. Surely every ordinary individual satisfies clause (i). 
Clause (ii) is satisfied since ordinary individuals are not exemplifiable and a 
fortiori not multiply exemplifiable. For the same reason, every ordinary in-
dividual satisfies clause (iii). So (I) has no counterexample among ordinary 
individuals. Nor is God a counterexample to (I). So (I) rules in all individuals. 
But does it rule out all properties? Clause (ii) rules out all multiply exemplifi-
alble properties, and clause (iii) rules out all properties P which are such that, 
if they are exemplified, they are exemplified by exactly one item other than 
P, whether in the actual world, or in all possible worlds. Thus clause (iii) 
excludes such properties as being the teacher of Plato, and being identical 
to Socrates. So (I) rules out everything normally considered to be a prop-
erty. (Something exemplifiable only by itself is not normally considered a 
property.) 
Turning now to (P), we can see that it rules out every ordinary individual, 
and rules in every property. So both (P) and (I) seem intuitively adequate: 
they capture what we mean by "individual" and "property" across the entire 
range of normal cases. But the (P)-(l) pair does not enforce a dichotomy 
between individuals and properties; admirably latitudinarian, it allows for 
some properties to be identical to individuals. For if a property Q were 
exemplifiable only by itself it would count as a property according to (P) but 
also as an individual according to (I). Such a non-multiply exemplifiable 
self-exemplifying property Q, if exemplified, would not be exemplified by 
anything distinct from itself, thus satisfying clause (iii) of (1). Such a property 
would be both a property and an individual. As such, it would have some of 
the characteristics normally associated with properties, and some of the char-
acteristics normally associated with individuals. Properties, for example, are 
necessary beings but causally inert; individuals are capable of exerting cau-
sality. And so a thing that is both a property and an individual could be 
understood to be both necessary and causally efficacious. 
No doubt the above definitions of "individual" and "property" have been 
constructed with an eye toward saving divine simplicity from the jaws of 
incoherence. But it doesn't follow that the definitions are merely ad hoc or 
epicyclic. I would say instead that the usual definitions, according to which, 
necessarily, no property is an individual, beg the question against divine sim-
plicity. In so doing they represent an illicit extrapolation beyond what we can 
claim to know on the basis of the normal range of cases. They ought to be rejected 
in favor of the more modest definitions proposed here which capture everything 
that needs to be captured regarding the normal range of cases. 
4. Simplicity via Self-Exemplification 
Are there any properties identical with individuals? Let us first be clear 
that 
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(4) Some properties are identical with individuals 
is logically compatible with 
(5) No property qua property is an individual 
and with 
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(6) The property of being a property is distinct from the property of being 
an individual. 
(5) and (6) are each undeniable; some sort of distinction between property 
and individual is a necessary feature of any conceptual scheme of which we 
can conceive. But it does not follow that no thing to which the concept 
property applies is a thing to which the concept individual applies. 
Are there, then, any properties identical with individuals? Yes, every prop-
erty whose self-exemplification entails its identity with an individual. Among 
these, I shal1 argue, are the divine attributes. 
No doubt there are self-exemplifying properties. Examples include exis-
tence, self-identity, being a property, being abstract, being self-exemplifying, 
being unextended, being inanimate. A curious feature of such properties is that 
each is identical with one of the properties it has, namely, itself. (That there are 
such partially ontologically simple entities should soften us up for the idea that 
there is a wholly ontologically simple entity.) Existence exists, self-identity is 
self-identical, etc. But these are all multiply exemplifiable, and thus not candi-
dates for the office of property whose self-exemplification entails its identity 
with an individual. Now consider omniscience. It is not obviously self-exempli-
fying (like the above examples), but it is not obviously non-self-exemplifying 
either (like the property of being married to Heidegger). And so the theist is 
not barred by logic or any canon of coherence from taking the view that 
omniscience is self-exemplifying. If it is self-exemplifying, then omniscience 
is omniscient; but not only that, omniscience = an omniscient individual. For 
it makes no sense to say that a property distinct from every individual is 
all-knowing. This would imply that some such properties are conscious. Al-
though there is the property of being conscious, and the property of being an 
accusative of consciousness, the subject of consciousness, that which is con-
scious, cannot be a property, unless of course it is identical with an individual. 
Similarly for the other divine attributes. Since there is no contradiction in 
holding that omnipotence is self-exemplifying, there is no logical inconsistency 
in the view that omnipotence is omnipotent, and hence identical to an omnipotent 
individual. Still, it might be thought absurd to suppose that a property can have 
causal efficacy. But there is no absurdity if the property in question is identical 
to an individual. Indeed, if omnipotence is omnipotent, then it must be identical 
with an individual given the plausible assumption that properties distinct from 
individuals are causally inert. 
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This allows us to say that each divine attribute is identical to some indi-
vidual. Of course, it doesn't straightaway follow from this that each attribute 
is identical to the same individual in a way that would insure the identity of 
the attributes with one another. But it does follow if the divine attributes are 
necessarily coextensive. So one can, without contradiction, hold that there is 
one individual = God with whom each attribute is identical. And then, given 
the transitivity of identity, it would follow that the attributes are identical 
with each other. 
The argument, then, is this: 
(7) Each divine attribute, as both self-exemplifying and such that its pos-
sessor cannot be non-conscious, is identical with some individual or 
other. 
(8) Necessarily, the divine attributes are coextensive. 
Therefore 
(9) There is exactly one individual with which each attribute is identical. 
Therefore, by Transitivity of Identity, 
(10) The attributes are identical with each other. 
No doubt some will reject (8) by invoking the putative possibility of a being 
who has one or more of the divine attributes without having them all, e.g., a 
being who is omniscient but not omnipotent, or vice versa. But it is not clear 
that this a genuine possibility. Consider the following argument which makes 
lise of the characteristic S4 axiom of modal propositional logic, to wit, "Nec 
p -+ Nec Nec p:" 
(11) If (8) is false, then necessarily, (8) is false. 
(12) Possibly, (8) is true. 
Therefore, by Modus Tollens, 
(13) (8) is true. 
This argument appeals in its minor premise to the intuition that it is possible 
that the divine attributes be necessarily coextensive. My opponent's intuition, 
however, entails that it is impossible that the attributes be necessarily coex-
tensIve as the following argument shows: 
(14) Possibly, the attributes are not coextensive. 
(15) Necessarily, (14) (from (14) by characteristic S5 axiom: "Poss p -+ Nec 
Poss p"). 
(16) Impossibly, -(14) (from (15». 
(17) It is impossible that the attributes be necessarily coextensive (from (16». 
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Since my opponent's intuition entails the questionable (17), I am justified in 
holding that it is possible that the attributes be necessarily coextensive, 
which, via (11), entails that the attributes are necessarily coextensive. At least 
I am as justified in rejecting, as my opponent is in accepting, (17). 
The divine attributes, therefore, are both necessarily coextensive and, by 
the argument (7)-(10), identical with one another. Note, however, that the 
reason for saying that they are identical with one another is not that neces-
sarily coextensive properties are identical - Mann's view, which is false -
but that each divine attribute is identical with an individual, and the individ-
uals are identical with one another. 
5. The Divine Attributes as Haecceities 
Having argued that the divine attributes are necessarily coextensive, we must 
now confront the different question of whether they are multiply exemplifi-
able. Is it possible, for instance, that there be two or more omniscient, om-
nipotent, omnibenevolent, etc. beings? If this is a genuine possibility, it rules 
out divine simplicity.23 But given the soundness of the foregoing argument 
(7)-(10) for the identity of the divine attributes with each other and with God, 
it follows that it is not a genuine possibility. For suppose the divine attributes 
are exemplified by two beings. Given that each is identical with its attributes, 
it would follow by Transitivity of Identity that each is identical with the other, 
which contradicts the supposition. Hence the divine attributes are not multi-
ply exemplifiable. 
It follows that each divine attribute is a haecceity. Thus omniscience is the 
property of being identical to the omniscient being. Given that omniscience 
is self-exemplifying, it follows that the property of being identical to the 
omniscient being is identical to the omniscient being. 
We have now attained the modest goal of this paper. It remains to consider 
some objections. 
6. Is it Coherent to Suppose that the 
Divine Attributes are Self-Exemplifying? 
You say that there is no contradiction in holding that omnipotence is self-ex-
emplifying, but arguably there is. Omnipotence is the first-level property of 
being all-powerful. First-level properties are properties of individuals. But if 
omnipotence is self-exemplifying, it is a property of a property, which con-
tradicts the assumption that omnipotence is a first-level property. 
This is no objection to my theory. A first-level property is one that can be 
meaningfully predicated of individuals. (Thus being red is first-level, being 
numerous is not.) But it does not follow that no first-level property is also a 
second-level property. Existence, self-identity, being inanimate, being unex-
tended, being spatially unlocatable, are each both first-level and second-level 
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properties. Cartesian minds and extensionless points are unextended, but so 
are properties. Cartesian minds, unlike extension less points, are spatially 
unlocatable, but so are properties. Omnipotence as self-exemplifying, then, 
is both first-level and second-level. The objection collapses once it is realized 
that first- and second-level properties do not form mutually disjoint classes. 
Note also that if the objection were sound, it would prove too much, for it 
would prove that no first-level property is self-exemplifying, which is con-
tradicted by the examples just given. 
At this point the objector may just insist that omnipotence, omniscience, 
etc. are not self-exemplifying. She may even announce that these are "ana-
lytic truths" on the strength of the claim that no property is powerful or 
knowledgeable. But this would be but to genuflect before the dogma, already 
rejected, that no property is an individual. So it would appear that the objector 
can do no better than to beg the question against us. 
7. Modal Uniformity and the Supervenience of Omniscience 
If God is identical with his properties, then they are "modally uniform:" there 
can be no distinction between essential and accidental properties of God, 
which is to say, all such properties are essentia].24 This of course presents a 
problem: we want to say, among other things, that God contingently created 
this world, that he might have created a different possible world, or no world 
at all. If so, it cannot be the case that God is identical with the property of 
having created this world. For that would entail that, necessarily, God created 
this world. 
Here is a second form of the difficulty. Although God is essentially omni-
scient in that he knows all the conjuncts of whichever conjunction of propo-
sitions happens to be the conjunction of all true propositions, he is not 
essentially such that he knows the conjunction of all truths. For this conjunc-
tion is contingent, containing as it does such contingent propositions as 
Kasparov succeeded Karpov as world chess champion. Simply put, the con-
tent of omniscience might have been otherwise. Hence God cannot be iden-
tical with the property of knowing the conjunction of (what in fact are) all 
truths. 
These problems are sidestepped easily enough. The simplicity theorist need 
not hold that God is identical with all his properties; he need only hold that 
he is identical with all his essential properties. Thus we cannot accept the 
Augustinian idea that a simple being "is what it has" (quod habet hoc est) 
without qualifications. 25 For taken full strength, it implies that a simple being 
has no accidental properties. The property of having created this world, how-
ever, is arguably an accidental property of God, and thus not a property with 
which God can be identical. The same holds for the property of knowing the 
conjunction of all truths. 
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Having said this, we immediately confront another difficulty. It has been 
suggested (e.g., by T. V. Morris26) that omniscience is a property that super-
venes on infinitely many properties like knowing that Fischer beat Spassky 
in 1972. As Morris defines it, "If a property F supervenes [upon] a property 
G, then an instance of F essentially depends on there being some instance of 
G in association with which it exists, in the sense that no instance of F could 
exist unless some underlying instance of G existed simultaneously. "27 If so, 
God cannot be omniscient without having infinitely many properties. This 
problem is avoided, in part, if simplicity is construed as the doctrine that God 
is identical with his essential properties. Then we need not say that God is 
identical with the contingently had property of knowing that Fischer beat 
Spassky in 1972. But there are also such properties as knowing that 7 + 5 = 
12, knowing that 7 is prime, etc. and these are such that God has them in 
every possible world, hence they are "essential" to God in one standard use 
of this term. If God is identical with such properties, then either he is infi-
nitely many properties, or they are but one property. Neither disjunct is 
acceptable. They clearly cannot be one property, for they are not even coex-
tensive. 
This forces a further clarification. The claim that God is identical with all 
his essential properties admits of two interpretations depending on how we 
construe "essential." On the "standard" possible worlds interpretation, P is 
an essential property of x if and only if x has P in every world in which x 
exists. Couple this with a liberal view of properties, and the result is that the 
following count 'among my essential properties: being such that 2 + 2 ~ 4, 
being a sparkplug if a sparkplug, and so on. It is easy to see that each 
individual has nondenumerably many such essential properties. Thus there is 
a sense in which each thing has an "infinite essence." But this should give 
us pause. What do truths of logic and arithmetic have to do with my essence 
or nature? 
Thus it is natural to distinguish between essential properties as defined 
above, and a proper subset of these which might be called quidditative prop-
erties. Accordingly, being sentient, being human, being rational would be 
among my quidditative properties, whereas being such that 2 + 2 = 4 and its 
ilk would be among my merely essential properties. There is surely some sort 
of distinction here. In the case of God, omniscience would count among his 
quidditative properties, while knowing that 7 + 5 = 12 would be among his 
merely essential properties. The distinction is perhaps as follows. Quiddita-
tive properties are such that everything that possesses them does so essen-
tially. (This lays down a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a 
property's being quidditative.) Knowing that 7 + 5 = 12, in contrast, is had 
essentially by God, but only accidentally by Mann. Hence it is not a quiddita-
tive property. 
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Given the distinction, the simplicity theorist need only hold that God is 
identical with his quidditative properties. 
Accordingly, God is identical with omniscience, but not with the properties 
upon which omniscience supervenes. In sum, God is identical with his nature, 
but not with his trivially essential properties (e.g., the property of being such 
that 2 + 2 = 4), or with properties like the property of knowing that 2 + 2 = 
4, or with his accidental properties (e.g., the property of having created this 
world, the property of being believed by Plantinga to be non-simple). 
Nevertheless, the idea that omniscience is supervenient may lead to trouble. 
Por if God = omniscience, and omniscience supervenes on other properties, 
then God supervenes on other properties in a way that appears fatal to the 
divine aseity. But the simplicity theorist, although admitting that, necessarily, 
God is omniscient if and only if God knows every truth, is under no obligation 
to think of omniscience as supervenient. For he may think of it as supervened 
upon. God is omniscient not because he knows all truths; he knows all truths 
because he is omniscient. God's knowing that p, q, r, etc. thus depends or 
supervenes upon God's omniscience and the truth of p, q, r, etc. There does 
not appear to be in this any threat to the divine aseity. 
One final consideration. If God is omniscient, and omniscience entails 
being knowledgeable (in the sense that, necessarily, whatever is omniscient 
is knowledgeable), does it follow that God is identical with being knowledge-
able? If it did, I would exemplify God by virtue of exemplifying knowledge-
ability - a bizarre result. This outcome is easily avoided if we realize that 
omniscience does not entail being knowledgeable in a way that will cause a 
problem. For if being knowledgeable = being imperfectly knowledgeable, 
then omniscience most assuredly does not entail being knowledgeable. On 
the other hand, if being knowledgeable = being perfectly knowledgeable, then 
the entailment holds, but without the bizarre result. For nothing distinct from 
God is perfectly knowledgeable. Perhaps knowledgeability may be viewed 
as a genus of which perfect and imperfect knowledgeability are species. But 
such generic knowledgeability is plausibly construed as disjunctive: x is 
knowledgeable (rational, powerful, etc.) if and only if x is either perfectly or 
imperfectly knowledgeable (rational, powerful, etc.) Hence there are no ge-
neric properties of knowledgeability, power and rationality to give rise to 
difficulties. As D. M. Armstrong has compellingly argued, disjunctive "prop-
erties" are not genuine properties. 28 
8. Conclusion 
Although much more needs to be said, what has been said suffices to deflect 
the main accusations of incoherence. This is a good thing for theists, since 
as Leftow has shown, the simplicity doctrine is entailed by the central theistic 
belief that, necessarily, God is the creator and sustainer of everything distinct 
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from himself, together with the idea that God cannot create his nature. 29 The 
next step is to examine what it could mean to say that in God existence and 
nature are identical. This daunting task is wisely reserved for the sequel. 30 
9. Appendix: Divine Simplicity and Logically Simple Propositions 
Does God's absolute ontological simplicity demand that literal and reli-
giously adequate God-talk consist, at least in part, of logically simple prop-
ositions? Barry Miller answers in the affirmative: the possibility of literal 
God-talk adequate to a simple God rests on the possibility of logically simple 
propositions such that, if there are no logically simple propositions, there can 
be no literal and religiously adequate God-talk. 31 A logically simple proposi-
tion is one that lacks not only propositional components, but also sub-prop-
ositional components. Thus atomic propositions are not logically simple in 
Miller's sense, since they contain sUb-propositional parts. A proposition of 
the form "a is F," though atomic, exhibits subject-predicate complexity. 
What I shall argue, contra Miller, is that literal and adequate talk and 
thought about the simple God do not entail the possibility of logically simple 
propositions. This is a good thing, since, as I shall also argue, there are and 
can be no logically simple propositions. So I will need to show how logically 
complex propositions .can be adequate to an Absolute that is simple. I thereby 
engage one of deepest questions in metaphysics: How can we say or think 
anything about the non-dual Absolute Reality without distorting it? Or are 
we in the Tractarian predicament of having to fall silent before that of which 
we cannot speak? 
On the Complex Grasp o/the Simple 
Given that God is ontologically simple, God is identical with each of his 
attributes. But why must a proposition about the simple God be logically 
simple? Miller writes, 
To have accepted the strict propriety of using a name and first-level predicates 
of God would have been to accept that there was a distinction to be drawn 
between the referent of the name and the attributes to which the predicates 
refer. We should therefore have had to admit that there was, after all, a 
distinction between him and his existence, and between him and his attri-
butes, and thus that he was not absolutely simple. We had a choice - either 
to say that God was absolutely simple, or to say that he could have a name 
and receive first-level predicates that refer to real rather than to merely 
Cambridge properties. What we could not do consistently was to affirm both 
these positions together. It is not that we could not name God, though some 
superior being could: the fact is that not even God could name God.32 
Miller appears to be making two assumptions, both necessary for the va-
lidity of his argument. The first is that 
(1) No property is an individual. 
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The second is that 
(2) Names refer only to individuals; predicates refer only to properties. 
It follows from (1) and (2) that anything that can be named is an individual 
and not a property, and anything that can be predicated is a property and not 
an individual; hence nothing simple can be named or have any property 
predicated of it. Literally true propositions about a simple God must therefore 
be logically simple. Complex propositions would import a false complexity 
into the divine nature. 
But if God is indeed simple, shouldn't we conclude that (1) is false? We 
begin by noting that "God is simple" can be construed in three different ways. 
A. It could be taken to mean that God transcends, while leaving intact, the 
property-individual dualism. Thus God would be neither an individual nor a 
property in univocal senses of these terms. This is Miller's approach.33 
B. On a second construal of "God is simple," God falls on one or the other 
side of the individual-property dualism. Thus Alvin Plantinga thinks that if 
God is identical with his properties, then God is himself a property, hence an 
abstract object, and therefore without causal efficacy.34 But one might just as 
well argue that if God is identical with his properties, then the properties are 
one individual, hence concrete, and therefore causally efficacious. These 
arguments neutralize each other, forcing us to examine the assumption they 
both rest on, namely, that no property is an individual. The simplicity theorist 
is by no means compelled to say that God is a causally inert abstract object, 
for he may reject (I). But even if he, like Miller, accepts (1), he may avoid 
Plantinga's conclusion by saying that God transcends the dualism of property 
and individual. Plantinga has not refuted the simplicity doctrine. 
C. Surely someone who maintains that the Absolute Reality is free of 
internal distinctions is not holding that it falls on one side of some distinc-
tion-pair. Plausibly construed, the simplicity claim is rather that God is nei-
ther an individual nor a property (thus transcending the individual-property 
dualism) or both an individual and a property. Miller's view seems to be that 
God transcends the individual-property dualism. The view defended above is 
the quite different idea that the dualism is untenable, that God is both an 
individual and a property. 
If I am right in the main body of this paper, there is nothing obviously 
incoherent in the idea that the simple God is at once both a self-exemplifying 
property and an individual. We are now in a position to see that literal talk 
about a simple God does not require logically simple propositions. 
Given that every self-exemplifying property is identical with at least one 
of its properties, it follows that the logical complexity of a proposition is 
compatible with the (partial) ontological simplicity of what the proposition 
is about. For example, the logical complexity of the proposition expressed 
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by "Self-identity is self-identical" is compatible with the identity of self-iden-
tity with itself, and thus with the partial ontological simplicity of self-identity. 
The literal truth of the proposition in question does not entail that self-identity 
is distinct from itself. Nor does the literal truth of "Existence exists" entail 
that existence is not existence. There is such a thing as self-predication. Thus 
there is no reason to think that logically complex propositions cannot be 
adequate to the wholly simple God. The literal truth of the proposition ex-
pressed by "God is omniscient" does not entail that God is distinct from 
omniscience, that God merely has or exemplifies omniscience, for "God" may 
be construed as referring to a self-exemplifying property that is identical with 
all its attributes. 
It might be thought that the need for logically simple propositions could 
be avoided without the rejection of (1). One might say that God is a self-ex-
emplifying property but not also an individual. This would obviate the need 
for logically simple propositions, but it does seem that Plantinga is right in 
holding that no mere property (i.e., a property distinct from every individual) 
could be an agent who created the world. So it seems to me that (1) should 
be rejected. 
Are There Logically Simple Propositions? 
I have just argued that philosophical theology has no need of logically simple 
propositions. What I will now argue is that, whether we need them or not, 
there are and can be no logically simple propositions (LSPs). 
Since LSPs are not predications, they do not say something about some-
thing in the way that "a is F' predicates being F of a, or "Fs exist" predicates 
instantiation of the property of being F. So if a LSP is about a thing, it can 
be about it only in the way names are about individuals, or predicates are 
about properties. But neither names nor predicates have truth-values. Neither 
"Socrates" nor .... .is wise" are true or false. So it is completely unclear how 
a LSP can have a truth-value. 
It is also completely unclear how any intellect like ours could grasp a 
proposition devoid of logical parts, let alone believe or know such a propo-
sition. To believe that it is snowing, for example, is to believe something 
logically complex, something formulatable perhaps by the sentence "Snow 
is falling." So even if there are logically simple propositions, they could not 
be accusatives of minds like ours. And if propositions are defined as the 
possible accusatives of belief and knowledge, then the point is stronger still: 
there cannot be any logically simple propositions. 
Miller's examples of LSPs are all of them inconclusive. Consider the Ger-
man "Es regnet" ("It is raining"). As Miller correctly notes, the "es" is 
grammatical filler, and so the sentence can be pared down to "Regnet," which 
is no doubt grammatically simple. He then argues: 
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Now there is no question of 'Regnet' being a predicate; for as a proposition 
it has a complete sense, whereas as a predicate it could have only incomplete 
sense. Hence, 'Regner' and propositions like it seem to be logically simple.35 
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I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that Mi11er is simply confusing propo-
sitions with the sentences used to express them. 
From the fact that the sentence "Regnet" is grammatically simple, contain-
ing as it does neither a name nor a predicate, it scarcely follows that the 
proposition expressed by the sentence is logically simple. My point is sus-
tained even if we acquiesce in Mi11er's usage, according to which a proposi-
tion is ..... an expression to which truth values can be assigned ... "36 rather than 
the sense of an expression to which truth values can be assigned. My argu-
ment is then that the grammatical simplicity of an expression E does not entail 
the logical simplicity of the sense expressed by E. Miller admits that there is 
a distinction between grammatical and logical simplicity;37 if so, it cannot be 
a sentence that is logically simple, it must be the sentence's sense, what I call 
the proposition and what Frege called "der Gedanke," the thought. Once this 
distinction is granted, a gap opens up that prevents a move from the simplicity 
of a sentence to the simplicity of its sense. 
In sum, there are conclusive reasons for rejecting LSPs, and no conclusive 
reasons for accepting them. And as shown in the preceding section, we don't 
need them anyway. The ontologically simple God can be adequately de-
sc:ribed by logically complex propositions. 
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